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SAFEGUARDING WATER QUALITY IN
FEDERAL LICENSING DECISIONS:
CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO
RECENT CONSTRAINTS ON CLEAN
WATER ACT SECTION 401
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY
KRISTIN PEER1 AND STACY GILLESPIE2
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Clean Water Act section 401, state water quality certifi-
cation authority to regulate federally-licensed energy projects has been
relatively well settled for decades.  Long-standing precedents from the
U.S. Supreme Court, other federal courts, the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (“U.S. EPA”), and implementation of certification au-
thority by the states, have repeatedly reinforced the cooperative
federalism principle of the Clean Water Act: state section 401 certifica-
tion authority is essential to preserve the states’ ability to address a wide
1 Kristin Peer is the Deputy Secretary and Special Counsel for Water Policy at the California
Environmental Agency (“CalEPA”) and in that capacity has worked closely with the State Water
Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”) over the last several years to respond to changes in
the state’s Clean Water Act Section 401 certification authority. This article was written in the
authors’ personal capacity and the views expressed in this article do not reflect the views of any
person or entity other than the authors, and, in particular, do not reflect the positions of CalEPA or
the State Water Board.
2 Stacy Gillespie is Senior Staff Counsel in the Office of Chief Counsel for the State Water
Board. In that capacity, Ms. Gillespie provides advice and lead support for the Board’s development
of statewide water quality control plans and policies that implement the Clean Water Act and the
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act and acts as one of the Board’s counsel for petitions for
review of regional water board actions. Ms. Gillespie is also currently serving as the Special Advisor
to the Deputy Secretary and Special Counsel for Water Policy at CalEPA. This article was written in
the authors’ personal capacity and the views in this article do not reflect the views of any person or
entity other than the authors, and, in particular, do not reflect the positions of the State Water Board
or the Office of Chief Counsel advising that Board, or CalEPA.
1
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range of pollution problems caused by federally-permitted energy
facilities.
In recent years, however, state section 401 certification authority
has come under siege in the courts, by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”), and through federal rule changes.
Commencing in 2019 with Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“Hoopa Valley”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia found that the states of California and Oregon
had waived their authority to issue water quality certifications for a large
hydroelectric project on the Klamath River by failing to act within one
year—despite the applicant’s timely “withdrawal-and-resubmission” of
its 401 certification requests.3  In doing so, the court upended a common
practice used by certification applicants nationwide to avoid a premature
denial or waiver owing to the one-year statutory deadline within which
states must act.4
The case has had wide-reaching effects.  FERC has applied Hoopa
Valley broadly and, in many instances, expanded its holding, resulting in
multiple states, including California, having their authority to issue water
quality certifications and impose conditions on federally-licensed energy
projects deemed waived by FERC.  The practical effect of these waiver
decisions is that states may have lost their sole regulatory tool to protect
water quality from impacts of these energy projects for as much as 40 to
50 years.
Further restricting state authority to assure impacts from FERC-li-
censed facilities comply with pertinent water quality requirements, in
2019, the Trump Administration’s U.S. EPA finalized a new Clean
Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule (“Certification Rule”), radi-
cally narrowing the scope of state certification authority and placing new
procedural limitations on that authority.
This Article examines the interrelationship of the Federal Power Act
and the Clean Water Act with respect to states’ duties to protect water
quality.  It then explores how section 401 is being redefined by the
Hoopa Valley decision and U.S. EPA’s Certification Rule, and discusses
the State of California’s response to those recent events.  Ultimately, it
remains to be seen whether the numerous legal challenges currently un-
derway to test the legality of the federal agency actions will succeed in
3 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n (Hoopa Valley), 913 F.3d 1099, 1105
(D.C. Cir. 2019). This paper will use “Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n and “FERC” interchangeably to
provide the commonly accepted case names in citations.
4 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
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re-aligning the states’ ability to regulate water quality within their
borders.5
II. THE FEDERAL POWER ACT AND CLEAN WATER ACT
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
The scope of state water quality certification authority under Clean
Water Act section 401 can best be understood by reviewing the interrela-
tionships of the Federal Power Act and the Clean Water Act and the way
in which courts have construed those authorities.
A. THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
Congress exercised its Commerce Clause authority over develop-
ment of the nation’s water resources through the Federal Power Act, to
be administered by the Federal Power Commission, FERC’s predecessor
agency.6  The Federal Power Act manifests its congressional intent for “a
broad federal role in the development and licensing of hydroelectric
power.”7  For example, section 4(e) of the Act authorizes FERC to issue
licenses for any hydroelectric project “necessary or convenient [. . .] for
the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along,
from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Con-
gress has jurisdiction” to regulate commerce.8  “These sources of consti-
tutional authority are all applied in the Federal Power Act to the
development of the navigable waters of the United States” and “leaves to
the states their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior
right” vested with FERC through the Act.9  The Federal Power Act’s
wide preemptive reach informs the scope of state section 401 authority
under the Clean Water Act.10
5 The analysis in this Article is current through March 14, 2021 and does not reflect factual or
legal developments beyond that date.
6 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n (First Iowa), 328 U.S. 152, 171-72
(1946).
7 California v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n (Rock Creek), 495 U.S. 490, 496 (1990).
8 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
9 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 171-72 (1946).
10 The doctrine of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution (art. VI., cl. 2) which states: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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B. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, as amended,11 commonly
known as the Clean Water Act, is a comprehensive federal statutory
scheme governing water pollution impacting the nation’s surface waters.
It is designed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation’s waters.”12  It was also enacted to attain
“water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife.”13  Those ambitious goals are achieved through a
cooperative federalism model whereby distinct roles are established for
the federal and state governments.14
With respect to the regulatory programs established by the Clean
Water Act, U.S. EPA, among other responsibilities, issues technology-
based effluent guidelines that establish discharge standards for certain
pollutants based on treatment or pretreatment technologies.15  For exam-
ple, U.S. EPA is required to set standards for new point sources,16 for
toxic discharges,17 and to establish pretreatment standards.18  U.S. EPA
also publishes the national priorities list of toxic pollutants.19  And U.S.
EPA develops national water quality criteria recommendations for pollu-
tants in surface waters for the protection of aquatic life and human
health.20  Those criteria provide guidance for states to use to establish
water quality standards for controlling discharges of pollutants.21
Under the Clean Water Act, states are required to establish water
quality standards.22  Water quality standards consist of designated uses
of a waterbody,23 numeric or narrative water quality criteria,24 and an-
tidegradation requirements to protect existing uses and high quality wa-
11 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388.
12 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
13 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
14 Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 287 (3rd. Cir., 2015).
15 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1316, 1317.
16 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B).
17 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2).
18 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b).
19 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a).
20 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a).
21 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(3), (7).
22 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b). U.S. EPA also has authority to establish water quality standards for a
state under certain conditions.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(b).
23 “Designated uses,” must include, among others, recreation and protection and propagation
of fish (commonly referred to as the Act’s “fishable and swimmable” goals). 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a);
see 40 CFR § 131.3(f) (defining “designated uses”). In California, designated uses are called “bene-
ficial uses” and water quality criteria are called “water quality objectives.” See generally, CAL. WAT.
CODE § 13050(f), (h) (describing beneficial uses and defining water quality objectives).
24 See 40 CFR § 131.3(b) (defining criteria as “elements of State water quality standards,
expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements, representing a quality of
4
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ters.25  Water quality standards serve as the backstop to the federally
established technology-based limitations by indicating whether addi-
tional control requirements are needed to achieve the goals of the Act.
Each state is also required to develop a nonpoint source manage-
ment program which identifies categories of nonpoint sources that add
significant pollution to navigable waters and develop best management
practices that will be undertaken to reduce the pollutant loadings.26
Consistent with its role as the agency in California authorized to
exercise power delegated to it under the Clean Water Act,27 the State
Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”) administers the
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (“Porter-Cologne Act”),
which establishes a comprehensive statutory program for water quality
control.28  California’s nine Regional Water Quality Control Boards have
primary responsibility for the adoption of water quality control plans for
all waters within their respective regions.29  Water quality control plans
consist of the designation of the beneficial uses to be protected, water
quality objectives, and a program of implementation to achieve water
quality objectives.30  The State Water Board may also adopt water qual-
ity control plans for waters for which water quality standards are re-
quired by the Clean Water Act.31  The beneficial uses together with the
water quality objectives contained in the water quality control plans con-
stitute state water quality standards.  In waters where water quality stan-
dards are not met, the Clean Water Act requires states to develop total
maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants and levels necessary to en-
sure the water quality standards can be achieved and maintained.32
TMDLs are one strategy to attain water quality objectives (with seasonal
variations and a margin of safety).33
The Clean Water Act envisions and retains the robust role of the
states to implement the Act to correspond with their traditional jurisdic-
water that supports a particular use. When criteria are met, water quality will generally protect the
designated use.”).
25 40 CFR § 131.12; see U.S.C. §§ 1312(a) (expressing a principal goal of the Clean Water
Act to “maintain” the water quality of the nation’s waters), 1313(d)(4)(B) (antidegradation require-
ments must be satisfied before taking certain actions, including revising effluent limitations and
water quality standards).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1329.
27 CAL. WATER CODE § 13160.
28 CAL. WATER CODE, Div. 7, §§ 13000-16104.
29 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13240, 13260, 13263.
30 CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(j)(1)-(3).
31 CAL. WATER CODE § 13170.
32 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d).
33 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1); 40 CFR §§ 130.7(b)(1) and (c)(1); CAL. WATER CODE § 13242
(requires a program of implementation to achieve objectives).
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tion over land and water resources within their borders.34  It adds that
“[e]xcept as expressly provided” in this Act, nothing shall “be construed
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters” of such states.35
C. THE FEDERAL POWER ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE
AUTHORITY IN SEVERAL LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
While Congress gave broad and exclusive grant of authority to
FERC over hydroelectric projects through the Federal Power Act—there
is no preemptive effect where Congress intends the state to have concur-
rent or exclusive regulatory authority.  Of the limited circumstances in
which the Federal Power Act does not preempt state authority,36 this Ar-
ticle briefly touches on the subjects that remain under the jurisdiction of
states (recognized by section 27 of the Federal Power Act) and more
extensively discusses the powers Congress vested to states in other fed-
eral law—Clean Water Act section 401.
34 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (expressly providing that the Clean Water Act seeks to “recog-
nize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and en-
hancement) of land and water resources . . . .”).
35 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
36 The major circumstances in which the Federal Power Act does not preempt state regulatory
authority over hydroelectric projects include:  Circumstances where other federal laws apply, includ-
ing Clean Water Act sections 401 and 404, the state may regulate federally licensed FERC facilities
in accordance with that authority. The Federal Power Act section 27 preserves limited state water
right authority over FERC-licensed projects. State authority over consumptive use or other non-
hydroelectric power use rights, such as irrigation or municipal use rights is also explicitly saved by
section 27 of the Federal Power Act. County of Amador v. El Dorado Cty. Water Agency, 76 Cal.
App. 4th 931 (1999); Corrected State Water Resources Control Board Order WR 2008-0014 at p. 31.
State regulation of rates and services is expressly preserved under section 20 of the Federal Power
Act. 16 U.S.C. § 812. State law actions for money damages are preserved under section 10(c) of the
FPA. 16 U.S.C. § 803(c). Additionally, under the self-governance exception to preemption, states
retain authority over state agencies and political subdivisions as owners or operators of FERC li-
censed hydroelectric facilities. See Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 3 Cal. 5th 677,
723-75 (2017), cert. denied (2018) (finding that there is no encroachment of the federal regulatory
domain by a state law that is otherwise not inconsistent with the federal regulation when applied to a
state entity); Corrected State Water Resources Control Board Order WR 2008-0014 at p. 31. States
also have their full authority over hydroelectric projects that are not subject to FERC licensing,
including federal facilities and federally authorized projects, which are exempt from regulation
under the Federal Power Act. See Uncompahqre Valley Water Users Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regul.
Comm’n, 785 F.2d 269, 274-75 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a specific statute authorizing the Secretary
of the Interior to contract with entities for the development and sale of surplus water necessary for
irrigation takes precedence over the general grant of authority in the Federal Power Act which would
otherwise control).
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1. Federal Power Act Section 27 Preserves Limited State Water
Right Authority over FERC-Licensed Projects
While the Federal Power Act grants exclusive licensing power to
FERC, Section 27 of the Federal Power Act expressly saves to the states
certain water rights authority.37  The reserved authority is limited to
“state authority over the control, appropriation and use, or distribution of
water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right
acquired therein.”38  The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally
construed the language in the aforementioned savings clause as limited to
preserving to the states’ exclusive authority over application of property
rights in water.39
In First Iowa, the Supreme Court held that the hydroelectric power
project applicant was not required to obtain a permit for the same project
under state law, as mandated by state law, because that law was not
among the subjects saved to states in section 27.40  The Court narrowly
construed the phrase “or other uses” as “confined to rights of the same
nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal
purposes.”41  The Court viewed the phrase “or any vested right acquired
therein” as underscoring the nature of the rights saved for the states as
those related to propriety rights.42
In Rock Creek,43 the Supreme Court rejected the State Water
Board’s argument that the minimum instream flow requirement estab-
lished under state water rights authority is related to the category of sub-
jects preserved to states under section 27 “to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used [. . .] for [. . .] other uses.”44  Applying
37 Section 27 provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or
in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other
uses, or any vested right acquired therein.
16 U.S.C. § 821.
38 16 U.S.C. § 821.
39 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n (First Iowa), 328 U.S. 152, 175-76
(1946); California v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n (Rock Creek), 495 U.S. 490, 506 (1990).
40 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 182. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the language in
Section 9(b) of the FPA (16 U.S.C. § 802(b)) “to engage locally in the business of developing,
transmitting and distributing power,” recognized dual control over permitting power projects. The
Court held that the state law requirements to obtain a permit for a hydroelectric power project con-
flict with those of the Federal Power Act; requiring compliance with the state law would subvert the
comprehensive purpose of the Federal Power Act Congress intended to vest in the predecessor of
FERC and were, therefore, superseded. Id. at 178-82.
41 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 175-76 (emphasis added).
42 Id.
43 California v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n (Rock Creek), 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
44 Id. at 497-98.
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First Iowa’s limited reading of section 27, the Court held that Califor-
nia’s instream flow requirements were not “saved” to the states because
they have nothing to do with “proprietary rights” or “rights of the same
nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal
purposes.”45
Because Congress has granted to FERC the exclusive regulatory au-
thority over licensing of hydroelectric projects, the extent of state author-
ity over single purpose FERC-licensed projects is limited under the
Federal Power Act to that which was expressly reserved to the states—
proprietary water rights.46  To be clear, that means that for single-pur-
pose hydroelectric projects, the State Water Board is prohibited from
utilizing its Porter-Cologne Act authority or its water rights authority to
administer water quality control or protect environmental quality under
section 27.47
2. Clean Water Act Section 401 Authorizes State Water Quality
Certification Authority Over FERC-Licensed Projects
While the Federal Power Act generally preempts state law over
FERC-licensed, single-purpose hydroelectric projects, it does not pre-
empt application of other federal laws.  Pursuant to authority provided by
other federal statutes, the states may regulate federally licensed FERC
facilities in accordance with that authority.48
The Clean Water Act gives states,49 in section 401, authority to
grant, grant with conditions, deny, or waive water quality certifications
before a federal license or permit is issued for activities that could result
45 Id. at 498 (quoting First Iowa, 328 U.S. 152, at 176). The Court held that FERC had the
exclusive authority to set minimum flows to remain in the bypassed section of the stream necessary
to protect fish and the more stringent flows contained in the water right permit issued by the State
Water Board pursuant to state law were invalid, reasoning that any other interpretation would give
states veto power over FERC’s licensing powers under the Act. Id. at 506-07.
46 Id. at 494-98.
47 Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., 183 Cal.
App. 4th 330 (2010). See supra note 37, identifying circumstances where preemption does not apply.
48 See PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dept. of Ecology (PUD No. 1), 511 U.S. 700 (1994); see
also Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41 (1987) (FERC licensed facilities are subject to
permitting requirements under section 404 of the Clean Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (authoriz-
ing states to issue 404 permits for some waters of the United States).
49 The certification authorities under Clean Water Act section 401 are states, authorized In-
dian tribes, or U.S. EPA depending on the entity that has jurisdiction over waters of the United
States in the location of the discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Pursuant to section 518(e) of the
Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA is authorized to treat Indian Tribes as a state for many purposes of the
Act, including section 401. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). This Article’s reference to “states” includes refer-
ence to authorized Indian tribes.
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in a discharge to the waters of the United States within their borders.50  If
a state grants certification with conditions, those conditions become con-
ditions of the federal permit or license.51  If the state denies certification,
the federal agency cannot issue the permit or license.52  A state’s deci-
sion on how to exercise those options depends on its determination of
whether the FERC-licensed activity that may result in a discharge will be
consistent with pertinent provisions of the Clean Water Act governing
the water quality standards, effluent limitations, new source performance
standards, and toxic pollutant restrictions, and “pertinent requirements of
state law.”53
Thus, and central to this Article, although the Federal Power Act
generally preempts states from administering state water quality control
authority over FERC-licensed projects, the Clean Water Act authorizes
states to certify that a proposed FERC-licensed project will comply with
the Clean Water Act requirements and with any other pertinent require-
ment of state law.54  Any provisions necessary to assure compliance with
those requirements must become conditions of any FERC license is-
sued.55  FERC cannot reject or modify a state’s conditions of certifica-
50 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The major federal permits and licenses subject to a state’s certifi-
cation authority include Clean Water Act section 402 permits (where U.S. EPA administers the
permitting program in non-delegated states), Clean Water Act section 404 permits and Rivers and
Harbors Act Sections 9 and 10 permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and hydro-
power and natural pipelines licenses issued by FERC.
51 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
52 Id. § 1341(a)(1).
53 The relevant text in section 401(a)(1) is:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not
limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any discharge
into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification
from the State in which the discharge originates [. . .] that any such discharge will
comply with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of
this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Those provisions to which section 401 refers are, respectively, Clean Water
Act sections 301 (effluent limitations for point sources), 302 (water quality related effluent limita-
tions), 303 (water quality standards and implementation plans), 306 (national standards of perform-
ance for new sources), and 307 (toxic and pretreatment effluent standards). The statutory provisions
that have the most relevance to this Article are sections 301 and 303.
Section 401(d) further provides:
[A]ny certification [. . .] shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and
monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant [. . .] will comply with
any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under sections 1311 or 1312 of
this title, and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such
certification, and shall become a condition [of the Federal license or permit].
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
54 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
55 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
9
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tion.56  Section 401 certification authority is, therefore, a significant tool
that allows a state to protect its water quality from the impacts of FERC-
licensed projects.
In enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress “sought to expand fed-
eral oversight of projects affecting water quality while also reinforcing
the role of states as the prime bulwark in the effort to abate water pollu-
tion.”57  The water quality certification authority granted to states is “one
of the primary mechanisms” through which states may exercise this au-
thority to protect water quality.58  In California, the State Water Board is
the designated state agency authorized to exercise power delegated to
states by the Clean Water Act.59  Thus, the State Water Board is the only
state entity with the authority to attach mandatory conditions to a FERC
license.  Other state agencies, like the California Department of Fish and
Wildlife, can only provide FERC with recommendations.60  Accordingly,
the State Water Board has the vital role of protecting water quality re-
sources from impacts of FERC-licensed projects for all Californians.
Importantly, under the Clean Water Act a state can waive its certifi-
cation authority if it “fails or refuses to act on a request for certification
within a reasonable amount of time (which shall not exceed one year)”
after receipt of a request for a water quality certification.61  The waiver
provision was intended to protect applicants from having their ability to
obtain a federal license frustrated by “sheer inactivity” of a state.62  But
Congress did not appear to consider the circumstances where such a pas-
sage of time was outside of the state’s reasonable control, like a state’s
need for additional information from the applicant to perform its certifi-
cation review, to accommodate settlement negotiations, or because of de-
lays requested by or caused by an applicant.  Additionally, the state water
56 Am. Rivers Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
57 Alcoa Power, Inc. v. FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 971; see also Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616,
622 (1991) (Congress “plainly intended an integration of both state and federal authority”).
58 Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d at 622.
59 CAL. WAT. CODE, § 13160.
60 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 495 (1990).
61 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(b)(5)(iii).
62 The language now found in section 401 was originally section 21(b) of the Federal Water
Pollution Act, through an amendment made by the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. Pub. L.
No. 91–224, 84 Stat. 91, § 103 (Apr. 3, 1970). As stated in the Conference Report:
In order to insure that sheer inactivity by the State . . . will not frustrate the federal
application, a requirement . . . is contained in the conference substitute that if within a
reasonable period, which cannot exceed one year, after it has received a request to cer-
tify, the State . . . fails or refuses to act on the request for certification, then the certifica-
tion requirement is waived. If a State refuses to give certification, the courts of that State
are the forum in which the applicant must challenge that refusal if the applicant chooses
to do so.
Conf. Rep. No 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2712, 2741.
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quality certification authority was enacted by Congress around the same
time that the California Legislature adopted the California Environmental
Quality Act (“CEQA”) and other states were adopting new environmen-
tal review laws.63  Accordingly, when Congress suggested a state’s certi-
fication should not take longer than one year, it likely did not consider
the time it may take to comply with state environmental laws, because
most of those laws were either very recently passed or not yet on the
books.64  As discussed below, in California, the time needed to comply
with CEQA requirements alone makes compliance with the one-year
timeframe in the Clean Water Act extremely difficult, if not impossible.
III. IN CALIFORNIA, COMPLEX PROJECTS AND REQUIRED STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW PROCESSES MAKE IT DIFFICULT
TO COMPLETE A SECTION 401 CERTIFICATION WITHIN
ONE YEAR
In California, federally-licensed energy projects requiring water
quality certifications are usually hydroelectric projects.65  Hydroelectric
projects have dammed many major rivers in the state and include signifi-
cant features that impact downstream water quality and fish populations,
including electrical generation pumps, cooling and conveyance compo-
nents and hatcheries designed to mitigate for the impacts to fisheries
from the projects.66  Anadromous fish species, such as salmon and steel-
head trout, may be blocked or hindered in their upstream and down-
stream migration due to the barriers presented by the projects.67
Reservoirs and other water impoundments can also alter the natural
streamflow affecting migration triggers.68  All of these projects’ elements
63 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, Div. 13, §§ 21000-21189.70.10.
64 Indeed, California was the first state in the nation to pass an environmental quality act,
signed by Governor Ronald Reagan in 1970 (See id.).
65 FERC, Complete list of active licenses (Jan 15, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/
files/2021-01/ActiveLicense_01.15.2021.xlsx.
66 § 37:3. Electric Consumers Protection Act and the environmental effects of hydropower
projects, 4 Pub. Nat. Res. L. § 37:3 (2d ed.) (Explaining that “a hydroelectric project is typically
composed of several components: a dam to impound a waterway, a channel to conduct the water to a
turbine, a powerhouse to create energy (which includes a turbine to convert water energy into
mechanical energy and a generator to convert mechanical energy into electrical energy), and a con-
duit to return the water to the waterway from which it was diverted. Each of these components can
adversely affect fish and wildlife habitat. Dams, for example, can inundate fish spawning grounds,
change water temperatures, increase pollutants, disrupt downstream gravel recruitment, and reduce
oxygen availability.”).
67 Murray D. Feldman, National Wildlife Federation v. FERC and Washington State Depart-
ment of Fisheries v. FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Ignores Ninth Circuit Rebuke
on Hydropower Permitting, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 319, 323 (1988).
68 Id.
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can have significant impacts on water quality and therefore must be care-
fully analyzed before the State Water Board issues a certification.69
In analyzing a section 401 certification application for a hydro-
power project, the State Water Board assesses the nature of the proposed
discharges, identifies conditions needed to protect water quality and de-
termines whether additional studies are needed to analyze the effects of
the discharges.70  Significantly, as mentioned above, the State Water
Board must also comply with CEQA before any certification is issued.71
Until recent changes in state law (explained more below), the State
Water Board was required to complete its CEQA analysis before it could
issue a certification.72  Due to most projects’ complexity and significance
of environmental impacts, CEQA review is almost always a lengthy and
expensive process.
Complicating matters even further, frequently the project applicants
are public water districts that have principal responsibility for carrying
out and approving the project as a whole, meaning they are the CEQA
“lead agency”—the only agency that can complete the CEQA review.73
As the lead agency, the public water agency applicants control when and
how the environmental review gets done.  The State Water Board has
jurisdiction over only part of the project; it is the “responsible agency”
under CEQA, and has the ability to help inform the environmental re-
view process by providing comments on the areas within its jurisdiction,
but it does not and cannot control the scope or timing of the environmen-
tal review.74
Prior to 2020, the practical impact of this CEQA dynamic was that
it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to complete water quality
certifications for hydroelectric projects within the one-year timeframe.
For years, consistent with well-established practice sanctioned by FERC,
to avert a premature denial of an application, a project applicant would
voluntarily withdraw its application before one year lapsed and then re-
submit the application, effectively restarting the federal clock and avoid-
ing waiver of the state’s authority.75  This allowed for room to ensure the
69 Andrew H. Sawyer, Rock Creek Revisited: State Water Quality Certification of Hydroelec-
tric Projects in California, 25 PAC. L.J. 973, 975-80 (1994) (discussing the impacts of hydroelectric
and other water development projects to water quality and fish, wildlife, and habitat beneficial uses
and citing National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 161-64 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
70 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, §§ 3855-61.
71 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.
72 Id.
73 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21067; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15050, 15051.
74 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002.1(d), 21067, 21069; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15051(a);
Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal. App. 4th 210, 239.
75 See e.g., Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC, 162 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,014 at para. 23 (Jan. 11, 2018);
Ridgewood Maine Hydro Partners, L.P., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,201, 64,425 (Dec. 27, 1996).
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application was complete enough for the state to prepare the certification
and to account for any complexities encountered during the certification
and environmental review processes.  In many cases, the withdrawal and
resubmittal of applications also created space for negotiation of settle-
ment agreements.76
IV. SWEEPING CHANGES TO CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY—IMPLIED
WAIVER
The first recent major change to states’ section 401 water quality
certification authority came with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hoopa
Valley in 2019.77  This decision, as interpreted by FERC, effectively in-
validated the longstanding practice of “withdrawal-and-resubmission,”
putting an abrupt and retroactive end to the customary method of avoid-
ing premature denial of a certification and waiver of a state’s 401 certifi-
cation authority where a certification was not completed within one
year.78
A. BACKGROUND ON THE HOOPA VALLEY CASE AND KLAMATH
RIVER DAM REMOVAL EFFORTS
The Hoopa Valley case involved a large hydroelectric project on the
Klamath River, which flows from Southern Oregon through Northern
California.79  Construction on the original project started in the early
1900s and extended through 1967, ultimately comprising several hydroe-
lectric dams, powerhouses and fish hatcheries.80  According to CEQA
findings issued by the State Water Board in 2020,81 the dams cause sig-
76 See e.g., Barrish & Sorenson Hydroelectric Co., Inc., 68 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62161, 64258 (Aug.
12, 1994); Ridgewood Maine Hydro Partners, L.P., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62201, 64408 (Dec. 27, 1996);
Citizens Utilities Co., 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62119, 64242 (Nov. 21, 2003).
77 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d 1099, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
78 Id. at 1105.
79 Id. at 1101.
80 Id.; see also PACIFICORPS, Klamath River (Project Overview), https://www.pacificorp.com/
energy/hydro/klamath-river.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
81 On April 7, 2020, the State Water Board issued a water quality certification for a project to
remove four of the dams that are part of the Lower Klamath project. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL
BD., IN THE MATTER OF WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION FOR KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORPORA-
TION LOWER KLAMATH PROJECT LICENSE SURRENDER, FERC PROJECT NO. 14803 (April 7, 2020).
Prior to the issuance of the water quality certification, the State Water Board prepared a CEQA
Environmental Impact Report and issued CEQA Findings and Statements of Overriding Considera-
tions. Id. at Attachment 4 (CEQA FINDINGS AND STATEMENTS OF OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION FOR
THE LOWER KLAMATH PROJECT LICENSE SURRENDER (Apr. 2020)).
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nificant water quality impacts.82  In fact, the impacts of the facilities to
the Klamath’s once-robust salmon fishery have been nothing short of
devastating,83 resulting in an existential threat to the way of life for many
tribal communities, who for thousands of years have relied on the salmon
for cultural practices, economic well-being, and basic subsistence.84
The Klamath Project’s initial FERC license was issued in 1954 and
its first relicensing effort began in 2004.85  The relicensing meant that for
the first time in the 100-year history of the Project, it would be required
comply with modern federal environmental laws.  Similarly, when
PacifiCorp filed its requests to California and Oregon for section 401
water quality certifications in 2006, it was also to be the first time the
states of California and Oregon would have a chance to condition the
Klamath Project for the protection of downstream water resources.
Once the relicensing process began, PacifiCorp, the current owner
of the Klamath hydroelectric project,86 faced with the daunting expense
of upgrading the dams to modern environmental standards, entered  into
negotiations that ultimately culminated in an agreement to remove the
dams.  The agreement, the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement
(“KHSA”),87 was signed by more than 40 parties, including the United
82 Id. at Attachment 4, pp. 1-4. Additionally, portions of the Klamath River and the hydroe-
lectric facilities that make up the Klamath Project are on the list of threatened and impaired waters
for California, which states are required to submit to U.S. EPA every two years. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d). See Lower Klamath Project: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Project No. 14803,
CAL. WATER BOARDS, https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_
quality_cert/lower_klamath_ferc14803.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
83 John Heil, The Natural Portfolio: Spring-run Chinook Salmon-essential to life history di-
versity, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PAC. S.W. REGION (May 8, 2020) https://www.fws.gov/cno/
newsroom/Featured/2020/Natural_Portfolio/. See also Species Directory: Coho Salmon, NOAA
FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/coho-salmon.
84 Alexander Matthews, The Largest dam-Removal in US History, BBC FUTURE (Nov. 10,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201110-the-largest-dam-removal-project-in-american-
history; Jose Del Real, Sick River: Can These California Tribes Beat Heroin and History, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/us/klamath-river-california-tribes-
heroin.html.
85 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d 1099, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that the Klamath hydropower
dams were originally licensed in 1954 to PacifiCorp’s predecessor and the original license expired in
2006); Lower Klamath Project: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Project No. 14803, supra
note 82.
86 PacifiCorp is owned by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.
87 Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA) (Feb. 18, 2010, as amended Apr. 6,
2016 & Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.klamathrenewal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2016.12.31-
Executed-and-Amended-Final-KHSA.pdf. A second agreement was signed at the same time, the
Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement, which was designed to balance water use between the envi-
ronment and farmers, provide funding for restoration and irrigation and fund economic development
opportunities for the local communities. Due to inaction by Congress, the original agreements ex-
pired by their own terms in 2015. In April 2016, the KHSA was amended and remains the agreement
governing the ongoing dam removal effort. See KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORP., Settlement Agree-
ments, https://www.klamathrenewal.org/settlement-agreements/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
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States, agencies of the states of California and Oregon, Tribes, irrigators,
environmental organizations and dozens of others.88
The negotiations were formalized in 2008, making it a distinct pos-
sibility that neither a new FERC license nor the California and Oregon
401 certifications would be necessary.89  Once the KHSA and related
agreements were signed in 2010, the signatories specifically asked the
State Water Board and the Oregon Department of Water Quality (Ore-
gon’s certification agency) to hold their section 401 certification pro-
ceedings in abeyance while the settlement agreements90 were
implemented.91  Because the signing of the KHSA could have mooted
the relicensing application and lead to dam removal if implemented, the
project’s relicensing effort was also put into abeyance by FERC, and the
project continued to be operated on annual licenses.92
Additionally, pursuant to the terms of the KHSA, PacifiCorp with-
drew and resubmitted its 401 certification requests each year to toll the
one-year statutory period under section 401 within which states must
act.93  PacifiCorp’s annual withdrawal and resubmittal was done to avoid
expenditure of time and resources in pursuit of permits it may not need,
but also to preserve the ability to obtain them if the KHSA was not im-
plemented.  Given the common practice at the time, those involved as-
sumed this was the appropriate and effective way to preserve the states’
certification authority should the dam removal negotiations fail.
The Hoopa Valley Tribe, which was not a signatory to the KHSA or
the other related agreements, petitioned FERC in May 2012 for a declar-
atory order that California and Oregon had waived their section 401 au-
thority.94  In June 2014, FERC denied that petition finding that
88 Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement, supra note 87, at 60-98.
89 In 2008, the negotiating parties entered into an “Agreement in Principle” to resolve litiga-
tion and other controversies in the Klamath Basin, with the express intent to “find a path to Facilities
removal.” See Agreement in Principle 1 (Nov. 2008), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/archive
/news/archive/08_News_Releases/klamathaip.pdf.
90 The State Water Board was not a signatory to the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agree-
ment. See Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement, supra note 87, at 60-98.
91 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fourth Klamath Abeyance Resolu-
tion, State Water Resources Control Board Resolution No. 2012-0039 (July 17, 2012).
92 If a new license is not granted prior to the expiration of the existing license, FERC may
issue to the licensee an annual license to operate a project from year to year, “under the terms and
conditions of the existing license until . . . a new license is issued.” 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1); Klamath
Water Users Ass’n v. FERC, 534 F.3d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding PacifiCorp entitled to
annual licenses under the Federal Power Act while its license application is pending).
93 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.
94 Id. at 1102. The motivation of the Hoopa Valley Tribe in pursuing the case was confusing
to some because it seemed to be seeking a remedy that would undermine its own authority (the Tribe
has “treatment as a state” with authority to set its own water quality conditions in a 401 certification,
but lost it when the court concluded that the state 401 certification authority had been waived).
Additionally, while it was not a signatory to the KHSA, it had expressed support for dam removal.
15
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California and Oregon had not waived their water quality certification
authority and that PacifiCorp had diligently prosecuted its relicensing ap-
plication for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.95  The Hoopa Valley
Tribe then sued FERC in the D.C. Circuit on December 14, 2014.96
The first iteration of the KHSA was subject to certain contingencies,
including passage of federal legislation and a determination by the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior that dam removal should proceed.  By the end of
2015, however, neither federal legislation nor the required Secretarial
Determination (that relied on the passage of legislation) were secured.97
Due to the failure of those contingencies to realize, the KHSA and re-
lated agreements expired by their own terms.98  Nevertheless, the signa-
tories continued to request that the water quality certification process be
held in abeyance so the KHSA could be renegotiated.  The KHSA was
subsequently amended in 2016 and is one of the agreements governing
the dam removal process that is currently pending before FERC.99  Ini-
tially, the D.C. Circuit also held the Hoopa Valley case in abeyance to
allow the decommissioning to occur, but by May of 2018, when the
Amended KHSA still had not been fully implemented, the D.C. Circuit
took the matter out of abeyance and the case proceeded.100
B. THE HOOPA VALLEY DECISION
In Hoopa Valley, the D.C. Circuit ultimately resolved a single issue
in the affirmative: “whether a state waives its section 401 authority
when, pursuant to an agreement between the state and applicant, an ap-
plicant repeatedly withdraws-and-resubmits its request for water quality
certification over a period of time greater than one year.”101
The Court found that the states and PacifiCorp’s contractual agree-
ment (the KHSA) to have PacifiCorp withdraw and resubmit its 401 cer-
tification applications to toll the one-year period consisted of an
Because the states’ 401 certification authority was a significant driver of PacifiCorp’s agreement to
decommission and remove the dams, seeking a waiver of that authority seemed to undermine the
dam removal effort. In filings, however, the Tribe expressed the position that the outdated license
and conditions were harming the Tribe’s interests and that an updated license could bring the project
into conformance with current resource protection laws. Brief of Hoopa Valley Tribe at 22, Hoopa
Valley Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 14-1271).
95 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1102.
96 Id.
97 This was not without significant effort to get legislation passed. Bills were introduced in
2011, 2014 and 2015. S. 1851 & H.R. 3398, 112th Congress (1st Sess. 2011); S. 2379 & S. 2727,
113th Congress (2d Sess. 2014); S. 133, 114th Congress (1st Sess. 2015).
98 See generally Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement, supra note 87.
99 Id.
100 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1102.
101 Id. at 1103, emphasis added.
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improper “scheme” to delay water quality certification and avoid
waiver.102  The court reasoned that this withdrawal and resubmittal
“scheme,” if allowed, could indefinitely delay the federal licensing ac-
tion, and concluded that it was ineffective to extend the period within
which a state must act.103  “Such an arrangement,” the court reasoned,
“does not exploit a statutory loophole; it serves to circumvent a congres-
sionally granted authority over the licensing, conditioning and develop-
ing of a hydropower project.”104  The Court focused on the language of
the KHSA and concluded that “California and Oregon’s deliberate and
contractual idleness defie[d]” the statutory time limit and that the agree-
ment usurped FERC’s control over whether and when a federal license
could be issued.105
The Court’s focus on the contractual arrangement between the states
and applicant suggests that its holding should be limited to circumstances
where a state enters into a written agreement with the licensee to delay
processing the certification request.  If that is indeed what the Court in-
tended, then it should not have found waiver—at least with respect to
California.  While the California Governor and a two other California
agencies were signatories to the KHSA, the State Water Board was
not.106  The State Water Board accommodated the requests of the appli-
cant and other negotiating parties that it not take any actions in pursuit of
a 401 certification because the parties believed such actions would im-
pair implementation of the KHSA.107  While it could be argued that the
State Water Board’s willingness to hold the certification process in abey-
ance reflected too much deference to the negotiating parties and not
enough diligence, it is factually incorrect to conclude that the State Water
Board entered into a contractual agreement with the applicant to do any-
thing, let alone circumvent the law.
Unfortunately for the Water Board, it was difficult to correct the
Court’s apparent misconception that it was a party to the KHSA.  Since
the states declined to waive their sovereign immunity,108 neither was a
102 Id. at 1101-02, 1104.
103 Id. at 1104.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1101-02.
106 In addition to the Governor, the California Natural Resources Agency and Department of
Fish and Wildlife were signatories to the KHSA on behalf of California. Klamath Hydroelectric
Settlement Agreement, supra note 87, at 60-98.
107 Fourth Klamath Abeyance Resolution, supra note 91.
108 Under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, federal courts are precluded from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over a state unless the state consents to jurisdiction. U.S. Const. amend. XI. A state
can waive its sovereign immunity and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case against it
(Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997)), but it is common for states not
to consent to federal court jurisdiction in order to retain their sovereign immunity.
17
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party to the matter, even though it was their certification authority at
issue.109   While the State Water Board did submit an amicus brief argu-
ing against waiver and informed the court that it was not a signatory to
the KHSA,110 it had limited opportunity beyond that to ensure that the
Court knew it was not a signatory to the KHSA.  For example, when it
became evident at oral argument that the contractual arrangement related
to the 401 certifications in the KHSA would be central to the Court’s
decision, and it did not seem clear to the Court which California agencies
were (and were not) parties to the KHSA, the State Water Board could
not speak up at oral argument to clear the record because it was not a
party to the case.111  And of the parties that were able to speak during
oral argument—FERC and the Hoopa Valley Tribe—neither had an in-
terest in pointing out the nuance that while certain other California enti-
ties were parties to the KHSA, the State Water Board was not.  Indeed,
even though it was purportedly defending its own finding that the states
had not waived their authority, FERC ended up making it very clear to
the Court that it “sympathize[d]” with the Hoopa Valley Tribe’s position
and noted for the Court that the state’s lengthy delay in issuing Section
401 certifications was “regrettable.”112
It is possible the D.C. Circuit simply did not find it significant that
the specific agency with California’s section 401 certification author-
ity—the State Water Board—was not a party to the KHSA since Califor-
nia’s Governor and other state agencies were signatories.  After all, the
point was made in the State Water Board’s amicus brief.113  Addition-
ally, the factual error in the decision was addressed in a petition for a
writ of certiorari (albeit in a footnote), so the U.S. Supreme Court also
apparently did not find the error significant enough to warrant review.114
109 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1102-1103.
110 Brief of Amicus Curiae California State Water Resources Control Board in Support of
Respondent and Affirmance at 30, 32, Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 913 F.3d
1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 14-1271) (filed December 1, 2015).
111 A Deputy Attorney General with the California Attorney General’s Office representing the
State Water Board was at the oral argument but did not have an opportunity to speak since the State
Water Board was not a party. See Oral Argument Recordings, Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Fed. Energy
Regul. Comm’n, D.C. CIR. (OCT. 1, 2018), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings
2018.nsf/147ABBE5D626EB4A852583190059D9B5/$file/14-1271.mp3.
112 Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.
113 Brief of Amicus Curiae California State Water Resources Control Board in Support of
Respondent and Affirmance, supra note 110, at 30, 32.
114 An application petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court
by two interested environmental organizations, California Trout and Trout Unlimited, on August 26,
2019. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cal. Trout v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 140 S. Ct. 650 (2019), No.
19-257, 2019 WL 4072818 (U.S.). Twenty-one states, including California and Oregon, filed an
amicus to support the petition. Id.; Brief for the States of Oregon, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
18
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It nonetheless remains concerning that so much of the Court’s decision in
this case rested on the apparent incorrect assumption that there was a
formal contractual agreement between the State Water Board and
PacifiCorp to delay the certification process for the Klamath Project.115
Nevertheless, the Court’s focus on the contractual arrangement be-
tween the applicant and the states to withdraw and resubmit the same
application year after year is important because the holding of the case
appears to be limited to the practice of withdrawal and resubmittal under
those particular circumstances.  The Court could have—but did not—
expressly invalidate the practice of withdrawal and resubmittal alto-
gether.  Accordingly, the case could be viewed as leaving open the ques-
tion of whether, under different facts, a withdrawn request for a 401
certification that is resubmitted later, would be an acceptable
procedure.116
C. FERC’S BROAD AND RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE HOOPA
VALLEY DECISION
For now, the Hoopa Valley ruling stands as D.C. Circuit prece-
dent.117  Since Hoopa Valley was decided, FERC has applied the deci-
sion broadly and retroactively by finding that California waived its
section 401 certification authority in numerous cases. FERC has imposed
a waiver of the State Water Board’s 401 certification authority for four-
teen hydroelectric projects that are—and have been for decades—im-
pacting California’s water quality, many without modern environmental
protections.118   Like the Klamath Project, many of these hydropower
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin
as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners 15 n. 4, Cal. Trout v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 140 S. Ct. 650
(2019), No. 19-257, (filed on September 27, 2019). The petition was denied on December 9, 2019.
Cal. Trout v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 140 S.Ct. 650 (2019).
115 Despite similarities to the federal structure, California, like many other states, has a di-
vided executive power (unlike the federal government that is a unitary executive power). Marine
Forests Soc’y v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 1, 31. The executive function of the state
is dispersed among several elected officials, each of whom are independently accountable to the
voters. Id. California state agencies are therefore independent legal entities and the action of one
state agency cannot bind another. People v. Hy-Lond Enters., Inc. (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 734, 751-
52 (holding that a judgment obtained in litigation against one state agency did not bind other state
agencies that were not parties to the litigation).
116 See Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104 (construing section 401(a)(1)’s reference “to act on a
request for certification” to apply to “a specific request” and noting the record did not indicate
whether PacifiCorp’s resubmitted requests were “wholly new” and reaching its holding on the facts
presented).
117 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter, leaving intact the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion. Cal. Trout v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 140 S. Ct. 650 (2019).
118 Placer Cty. Water Agency (In re Middle Fork American River), 167 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,056
(2019); Yuba Cty. Water Agency (In re Yuba River Development Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,139
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dams are being relicensed by FERC for the first time since the enactment
of modern environmental laws, and once a new license is issued, the
project may not come up for relicensing again for 40-50 years.119
The State Water Board petitioned FERC to rehear each of its admin-
istrative waiver decisions and has challenged several of them in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, not only because of the impor-
tance of retaining the ability to protect California’s water resources
through its section 401 certification authority, but also because it does
not believe Hoopa Valley should apply.120
None of FERC’s post-Hoopa Valley decisions have facts that align
with the unique facts in the Hoopa Valley case.  In fact, in many of the
post-Hoopa Valley matters, FERC has extended the case to find that a
formal agreement between the licensee and the State Water Board was
not necessary to support a finding of waiver.121  Instead, where FERC
has determined the record shows both sides worked to ensure the with-
drawal and resubmittal happened each year, or even where it concluded
that the State Water Board presumed the applicant would withdraw and
resubmit to prevent the State Water Board from having to deny certifica-
tion, it has concluded the State Water Board was complicit in delaying
issuance of a certification, thereby waiving its certification authority.122
In some of the cases, however, the record FERC relied on for the
waiver conclusion included informal correspondence from the State
(2020); Merced Irrigation District (In re Merced Hydroelectric Project, Merced Falls Hydroelectric
Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240 (2020);  Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. (In re Upper North Fork Feather
River), 172 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,064 (2020); S. Cal. Edison Co. (In re Big Creek Hydroelectric Projects)
(includes six hydropower projects), 170 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,135 (2020); Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. (In re
Kilarc-Cow Creek Hydroelectric Project), 170 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,232 (2020); S. Feather Water and
Power Agency, 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,242 (2020); Nevada Irrigation District (In re Yuba-Bear Hydroe-
lectric Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,029 (2020). And there is another waiver request currently pending
at FERC, Pacific Gas & Electric’s Mc-Cloud Pitt Hydroelectric Project, FERC Project No. 2106. If
past is prologue, the list will continue to grow.
119 See e.g., Placer Cty. Water Agency (In re Middle Fork American River), 167 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,056 (2019) (license last issued in 1963); Merced Irrigation District (In re Merced Hydroelectric
Project, Merced Falls Hydroelectric Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240 (2020) (license last issued in
1965); Yuba Cty. Water Agency (In re Yuba River Development Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,139
(2020) (license last issued in 1963); Nevada Irrigation District (In re Yuba-Bear Hydroelectric Pro-
ject), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,029 (2020) (license last issued in 1963).
120 State Water Resources Control Board v. FERC (Nevada Irrigation District), No. 20-72432
(9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2020); State Water Resources Control Board v. FERC (Yuba County Water
Agency), No. 20-72782 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2020); State Water Resources Control Board v. FERC
(Merced Irrigation District), Case No. 20-72958 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).
121 See e.g., Placer Cty. Water Agency (In re Middle Fork American River), 167 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,056 (2019) (waiver order issued April 18, 2019); Yuba Cty. Water Agency (In re Yuba River
Development Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,139 (2020) (Waiver order issued May 21, 2020); Merced
Irrigation District (In re Merced Hydroelectric Project, Merced Falls Hydroelectric Project), 171
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240 (2020) (waiver order issued June 18, 2020).
122 Id.
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Water Board to the applicant reminding the applicant of the upcoming
one-year deadline and explaining that it would need additional informa-
tion, sometimes including a completed CEQA document, before it could
issue a certification.123  In these cases, there was no express agreement
between the licensee and the state to delay the process, but rather, there
was evidence of the state exercising diligence to keep the process mov-
ing.  Nonetheless, finding the State Water Board’s conduct evidenced the
existence of an implied agreement or at least complicity in the delay, and
citing the Hoopa Valley case as the basis, FERC has found the State
Water Board waived its certification authority in each case where the
applicant withdrew and resubmitted its application and later sought a
waiver order from FERC.124
Moreover, these waiver decisions have been retroactively applied
by FERC to certification requests that were withdrawn and resubmitted
before Hoopa Valley was decided.125  This is true even though prior to
Hoopa Valley, FERC had long held that an applicant’s withdrawal and
resubmittal started a new one-year certification period.126  As recently as
2018, FERC stated in an order: “[w]e reiterate that once an application is
withdrawn, no matter how formulaic or perfunctory the process of with-
drawal and resubmission is, the refiling of an application restarts the one-
year waiver period under section 401(a)(1).”127  Prior to the Hoopa Val-
ley case, the State Water Board therefore relied on the common—and
sanctioned—withdrawal and resubmit practice as a mechanism for appli-
cants to avoid premature denial of a certification or waiver of the state’s
authority.  Based on prior FERC actions, its retroactive application of the
Hoopa Valley decision is troubling on equitable principles alone.
Finally, in several of the recent cases where FERC found waiver
due to the State Water Board’s purported complicity or inaction, the ap-
plicant was a public water agency—and therefore acting as the lead
agency for the purposes of CEQA—but never completed (and in some
123 Id.
124 See FERC cases, supra note 118.
125 See e.g., Placer Cty. Water Agency (In re Middle Fork American River), 167 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,056 (2019) (originally requested a 401 certification in 2011); Merced Irrigation District (In re
Merced Hydroelectric Project, Merced Falls Hydroelectric Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240 (2020)
(originally requested a 401 certification in 2014); Yuba Cty. Water Agency (In re Yuba River De-
velopment Project), 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,139 (2020) (originally requested a 401 certification in 2017).
126 See e.g., Barrish & Sorenson Hydroelectric Co., Inc., 68 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,161, 64,258 (Aug.
12, 1994); Ridgewood Maine Hydro Partners, L.P., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,201, 64,425 (Dec. 27, 1996);
Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Co., 113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,167, 61,653 at para. 19 (Nov. 17, 2005).
127 Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC, 162 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,014 at para. 23 (Jan. 11, 2018), rehear-
ing denied, 164 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61029 (July 19, 2018), order on voluntary remand, 168 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61129
(Aug. 28, 2019), rehearing denied, 169 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61199, 62461 (Dec. 12, 2019).
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cases never even started) the requisite CEQA review.128  Prior to last
year, the State Water Board could not have legally issued a 401 certifica-
tion without a completed CEQA document, and it often had no control
over that process.  Thus, to the extent there was delay and inaction that
led to the withdrawal and resubmittal of an application, it was typically
on the part of the applicant, not the state—making the finding of waiver
even more problematic as a potential means for applicants to avoid the
state certification process.129  At the very least, under the circumstances
where the applicant was the agent of delay, it seems that a more appro-
priate consequence for the lapse of the statutory timeline should not be a
waiver of the states’ certification authority, but rather a denial of
certification.
The State Water Board’s challenges to FERC’s post-Hoopa Valley
decisions of waiver will likely take years to make their way through the
courts.  If the State Water Board is not successful in limiting the reach of
Hoopa Valley in these matters, however, California will have lost its
principal authority to protect water resources from adverse effects of fed-
erally-licensed hydropower projects in numerous important watersheds
for a generation.
V. THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE’S RESPONSE TO HOOPA
VALLEY—A CEQA FIX
Hoopa Valley is a disappointing and consequential loss for the State
Water Board (and many other state certification authorities nationwide).
But FERC’s apparent willingness to apply the decision broadly and retro-
actively made it clear that the State Water Board’s ability to condition
FERC-licensed projects in California is under serious threat.  Since ad-
justment to the Clean Water Act by the U.S. Congress is uncertain, the
California Legislature took action to ensure preservation of this critically
important State Water Board authority.
On June 29, 2020, Governor Newsom signed amendments to the
California Water Code to provide the State Water Board with the author-
ity to issue 401 certifications before CEQA review is completed.130
128 See e.g., Merced Irrigation District, 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240 (2020); Nevada Irrigation Dis-
trict, 171 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,029 (2020).
129 Even when the State Water Board is CEQA lead agency, the applicant has substantial
control over the timing of CEQA compliance because the State Water Board needs a complete
project description and to make arrangements with the applicant for payment for preparation of
environmental documentation, which can sometimes turn into lengthy negotiations in and of
themselves.
130 CAL. WATER CODE § 13160, as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 18, § 9 (AB 92), eff. June 29,
2020.
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Importantly, the new law did not waive CEQA requirements for is-
suance of 401 certifications.  Instead, it was carefully crafted to preserve
the CEQA process.  It provides the State Water Board with authority to
issue certifications before CEQA review is completed, if waiting for such
completion “poses a substantial risk of waiver.”131  Once the CEQA pro-
cess is completed, the new law provides a mechanism for the Board to
reopen any final certification to incorporate CEQA findings or mitigation
measures, “to the extent authorized by federal law.”132
As a result, the new law adjusts the sequencing of the State Water
Board’s review, recognizing CEQA is not only time-consuming for these
complex projects but also frequently within the sole control of the project
applicant.  Its aim is to ensure the State Water Board can meet its 401-
certification deadline and protect water quality.  The Legislature there-
fore found a creative way to ensure that CEQA’s environmental protec-
tions are preserved without impeding the protections that can be provided
through the Clean Water Act.  These changes in the law ensure that the
State Water Board is in a better position to protect water quality into the
future despite new constraints resulting from the Hoopa Valley case.
Remarkably, however, the recent attacks on state certification au-
thority did not end here.  In 2019, the Trump Administration’s U.S. EPA
squarely targeted that authority, further stripping the states of their ability
to protect water resources within their respective borders.
VI. TRUMP-ERA ENVIRONMENTAL ROLL-BACKS FOR SECTION 401
AUTHORITY UNRAVEL JUDICIAL DECISIONS THAT HAVE
INTERPRETED THE AUTHORITY BROADLY
To understand how sweeping the Trump U.S. EPA 401 certification
regulations are in restricting state authority, it is important to understand
the judicial decisions that have long ratified an expanded view of the
scope of state section 401 authority.  The following addresses two U.S.
Supreme Court cases that evaluated a state’s authority to condition a cer-
tification, and important precedents from the federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals concerning federal agencies’ lack of authority to review or mod-
ify a state’s conditions of certification.
131 CAL. WATER CODE § 13160(b)(2).
132 CAL. WATER CODE § 13160(b)(2). Notably, the ability for the State Water Board to reopen
the certification to include additional conditions and address CEQA findings or mitigation measures
may be subject to a legal challenge, given U.S. EPA’s interpretation of its new rule governing
certifications. See discussion infra Section IV.D.2-3 and note 192. However, state conditions pre-
serving authority to reopen and amend 401 certifications are common and have been upheld as
consistent with the Federal Power Act. Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 102, 111-12 (2d Cir.
1997).
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A. PUD NO. 1:  STATE CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY EXTENDS TO THE
“ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE”
In PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dept. of Ecology (“PUD No. 1”), the
U.S. Supreme Court examined the State of Washington’s authority to
condition a certification under section 401 with a minimum instream
flow requirement to maintain the fisheries in the reach of a river from
which the project would divert water.133
Although the project at issue would have resulted in two possible
discharges, one from the release of dredge and fill material during project
construction and another from the end of the tailrace after having been
used to generate power, the instream flow requirement was not related to
the two possible discharges.134  The project proponent argued that be-
cause that requirement was unrelated to the project’s two possible dis-
charges, the requirement was impermissibly outside of the State’s
certification authority under section 401.135
The Court disagreed, holding that a discharge is the necessary con-
dition to trigger certification authority under section 401(a)(1), but sec-
tion 401(d) expands state certification authority “as authorizing
additional conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole once the
threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is satisfied.”136
To arrive at that conclusion, the Court evaluated the use of two dif-
ferent terms in section 401(a)(1) and section 401(d).  The Court reasoned
that while section 401(a)(1) ties state certification to a “discharge,” sec-
tion 401(d) ties certification to “the applicant.”137  Section 401(d) autho-
rizes states to place “any effluent limitations and other limitations [. . .]
necessary to assure that any applicant” will comply with the listed provi-
sions of Clean Water Act and “with any other appropriate requirement of
State law.”138
Having concluded that the certification may include requirements
placed on the project as a whole unrelated to the discharge, and recogniz-
ing that a state’s conditioning authority “is not unbounded,”139 the Court
then turned to the question of whether the instream flow requirement was
within the proper scope of section 401(d).140  The State asserted the in-
stream flow requirement was necessary to meet the applicable water
133 PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
134 Id. at 710-11.
135 Id. at 711.
136 Id. at 711-712 (emphasis added).
137 Id. at 711.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 712.
140 Id. at 712-13.
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quality standard adopted pursuant to section 303 of the Clean Water
Act.141  Although section 303 is not one of the provisions identified in
section 401(d), the Court concluded section 401(d) authorized a state to
place limits to ensure compliance with section 303.142  The Court rea-
soned that section 401(d) requires compliance with section 301, which in
turn incorporates section 303 by reference.  As a result, the Court held
that a state’s water quality standards143 adopted pursuant to section 303
qualify as a permissible “other limitation” to assure compliance with sec-
tion 301 of the Act.144  The Court also found that “limitations to assure
compliance with state water quality standards are also permitted by sec-
tion 401(d)’s reference to ‘any other appropriate requirement of State
law.’”145
Under PUD No. 1, certification authority is broad and includes limi-
tations related to water quality impacts from the project as a whole.146
That is, certification authority is triggered by a project’s possible dis-
charge, but once that authority is triggered, a state’s regulatory reach
extends beyond that threshold condition to project activities.  Moreover,
regulatory limitations may be used to assure compliance with Clean
Water Act provisions beyond those enumerated in section 401(d), includ-
ing section 303.147  While the Court declined to examine what additional
requirements could comprise the outermost scope of certification author-
ity based on “any other appropriate requirements of state law,” it held
that water quality limitations necessary for compliance with water qual-
ity standards established pursuant to section 303 are “at a minimum . . .
‘appropriate’ requirements of state law.”148
As a result, the State Water Board may impose conditions on certifi-
cations that are necessary to enforce beneficial (designated) uses, water
quality objectives (criteria), and TMDLs established in water quality
141 Id. at 712.
142 Id. at 712-13.
143 The project proponent also argued that the minimum flow requirement was impermissible
because its purpose was to protect a designated use (fish migration, rearing, and spawning), contend-
ing that section 303(c)(2)(A) required states to protect designated uses only through the implementa-
tion of specific numeric water quality criteria. The Court evaluated the plain language of section
303(c)(2)(A) and disagreed with the project proponent’s interpretation. The Court pointed out that
water quality standards consist of both components—designated uses and water quality criteria.
PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 714-715. “[U]nder the literal terms of the statute, a project that does not
comply with a designated use of the water does not comply with the applicable water quality stan-
dards.” Id. at 715.
144 Id. at 713.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 712-13.
148 Id. at 713.
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control plans.149  Because the reach of the state’s certification authority
extends to setting conditions or limitations on project activities and are
not limited to the discharge, a state’s regulatory authority extends to
water chemistry and fisheries management control actions related to
water quality impacts affecting beneficial uses caused by dam and pro-
ject operations.150  Such impacts may include, but are not limited to, re-
ductions in instream flow, changes in temperature, turbidity, dissolved
oxygen, algal productivity, siltation, loss of assimilative capacity, and
saltwater intrusion—in addition to direct impacts from the discharge
from project construction and the water from the tailrace.151
Thus, with the scope of certification authority adopted in PUD No.
1, the Court restored the states’ section 401 permitting authority previ-
ously held to be preempted by the Federal Power Act in First Iowa and
Rock Creek,152 reaffirming the cooperative federalism scheme of the
Clean Water Act.
B. S.D. WARREN:  TO BE SUBJECT TO STATE 401 CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITY, THE “DISCHARGE” NEED NOT INCLUDE A
POLLUTANT
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court in S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine
Board of Environmental Protection (“S.D. Warren”) was called upon to
address an issue readily accepted by the Court in PUD No. 1—whether
certification authority under section 401 is triggered by a dam’s potential
to have a “discharge” in the broad sense (i.e., a discharge of water from
the dam), without necessarily discharging any “pollutants.”153
Because the Clean Water Act does not define the term “discharge,”
the Court evaluated the Clean Water Act’s use of the term “discharge” in
section 401 and the triggering statutory phrase in section 402—a “dis-
charge of a pollutants.”154  The Act defines “discharge of pollutant” as
meaning “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source.”155  The Court found that the term alone in the context of
certification authority should be afforded its ordinary meaning, “flowing
149 See authorizing statutes, supra notes 30 through 34 and accompanying text.
150 See e.g., PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 709-710, 712-13.
151 See Sawyer, supra note 69, at 975-80 (discussing the impacts of hydroelectric and other
water development projects to water quality and fish, wildlife, and habitat beneficial uses).
152 See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Today, the Court gives the
States precisely the veto power over hydroelectric projects [through section 401] that we determined
in [Rock Creek] and First Iowa they did not possess [under the Federal Power Act].”).
153 S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd of Env’t Prot. (S.D. Warren), 547 U.S. 370, 376-87 (2006)
(discussing PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 711, 725).
154 Id. at 375, 380-85; see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1), 1362(12)
155 Id. at 381 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)).
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or issuing out,”156 and concluded that section 401 has a broader reach
than “discharge of a pollutant.”157
While the Court noted that the Clean Water Act defines “discharge
of pollutants,” in part, as coming from a point source, the Court did not
specifically address whether the triggering discharge for certification au-
thority must be from a point source.158  Yet the Ninth Circuit has con-
cluded that under section 401 the “discharge” must be from a point
source.159
As for the Court’s holding, the Court brought to focus the Clean
Water Act’s overarching goal of protecting the quality of the Nation’s
waters not just by controlling “the addition of pollutants” but also ad-
dressing “pollution” generally.160  Reinforcing the Clean Water Act’s
principal of cooperative federalism, the Court affirmed, “State certifica-
tions under section 401 are essential in the scheme to preserve state au-
thority to address the broad range of pollution.”161
C. AMERICAN RIVERS V. FERC:  FEDERAL AGENCIES LACK
AUTHORITY TO SECOND GUESS STATE 401 CERTIFICATION
CONDITIONS AND REVIEW IS IN STATE COURT
In American Rivers v. FERC, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether the seemingly mandatory language of section 401 of
the Clean Water Act effectuated an impermissible incursion into the Fed-
eral Power Act’s broad preemptive reach.162  As noted above, section
401 provides that any conditions imposed by a certification issued under
that section “shall become a condition” on any federal license or permit
subject to the section.163  But FERC argued that the Federal Power Act
empowered it to refuse to include certain conditions imposed by the
state’s certification if it believed the conditions to be beyond the scope of
156 Id. at 376 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary).
157 Id. at 375-76, 380.
158 Id. at 375-76 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining discharge of pollutants)).
159 Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, in
the context of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) Permits, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that discharges from dams are “point sources” but are not subject to NPDES permitting
requirements because dams do not discharge pollutants added by the dam or reservoir, and because
the type and severity of pollution caused by dams is so varied, dam regulation under the NPDES
permitting system would be impractical. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165, 171,
182 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
160 S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 385 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251 and citing and quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12) (defining “pollution” as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, phys-
ical, biological, and radiological integrity of the water.”)).
161 Id. at 386.
162 Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1997).
163 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
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a state’s section 401 authority.164  In rejecting that argument, the Second
Circuit held that FERC is bound by the mandatory language in section
401 to include state-imposed conditions.165  The Court reasoned that
while the Federal Power Act has a broad preemptive effect, the Clean
Water Act “has diminished this preemptive reach by expressly requiring
[FERC] to incorporate into its licenses state-imposed water-quality
conditions.”166
With respect to the ability to challenge state-imposed conditions, the
American Rivers v. FERC Court and other courts have concluded that the
proper venue is in state court.167  As a result, the federal agency has two
choices when a state grants a certification with conditions it finds to be
beyond the scope of section 401: it can either issue the license or permit
with the conditions, or it can refuse to issue the hydropower license alto-
gether.168  Notably, the Second Circuit found that while the federal
agency may not second-guess the appropriateness of a state’s conditions,
it is empowered to determine whether the state issued the certification
within the statutorily prescribed period or whether the proper state has
issued the certification.169  The implications here are that the federal
agency may not trespass into the substantive aspects of a state’s certifica-
tion, but it does have at least some authority to evaluate whether certain
procedural aspects of section 401 are properly satisfied.
D. HOW U.S. EPA’S “CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401
CERTIFICATION RULE” RESHAPES STATE
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY
During the decades following the decision in PUD No. 1, numerous
federal appellate courts addressed additional important features of sec-
tion 401, in addition to the waiver provision evaluated in Hoopa Val-
ley.170  On April 10, 2019, just two months after the Hoopa Valley case
was decided, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13868, “Pro-
moting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth.”171  In it, the for-
164 Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d at 102, 111.
165 Id. at 111.
166 Id. at 107, 111 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)).
167 Id. at 107, 110-11; see, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. U.S. EPA, 684
F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982).
168 Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d at 111 (2d Cir. 1997).
169 Id. at 110-11.
170 See, e.g., N.Y. State Dept. of Env’t Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 884
F.3d 450, 455-56 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding the statutory time period does not begin when the certify-
ing authority determines the request for certification is “complete” but upon “receipt” of the
request).
171 Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10, 2019).
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mer President highlighted America’s energy abundance and declared that
needless red tape to permitting energy projects and regulatory uncer-
tainty are a hindrance to realizing its full economic potential.172  It also
directed the U.S. EPA Administrator to review section 401 of the Clean
Water Act and related regulations to “take into account federalism con-
siderations underlying section 401” and focus on: timely federal-state co-
operation and collaboration, the appropriate scope of state water quality
reviews, the types of appropriate conditions that may be included in a
certification, the times for reasonable certification reviews, and the suffi-
ciency of information with which a state should substantively act on a
certification request.173
On June 1, 2020, U.S. EPA, for the first time in 50 years, enacted its
statutory interpretation of section 401 of the Clean Water Act, entitled
“Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule” (“Certification
Rule”).174  U.S. EPA addressed all the aspects of section 401 as di-
rected.175  As a result, the Certification Rule contains significant substan-
tive and procedural regulatory changes which diminish state certification
authority—including many that seem incongruent with the plain lan-
guage of the Clean Water Act and precedent interpreting that authority.
It comes as no surprise, then, that at the time of writing this Article,
the Certification Rule is subject to legal challenges in numerous federal
courts, including a multi-state challenge brought in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California.176
172 Id.
173 Id. at 15,495-96.
174 Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 121) [hereinafter Certification Rule]. The Certification Rule is effective
on September 11, 2020 and applies to certification requests filed on or after that date and not to
requests filed before that date. Id.at 42,287; see Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Final
Rule (Fact Sheet), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-06/documents/fre-
quently_asked_questions_fact_sheet_for_the_clean_water_act_section_401_certification_rule.pdf
(Question 6).
175 U.S. EPA characterizes the rule as “intended to increase the predictability and timeliness
of CWA section 401 certification actions by clarifying timeframes for certification, the scope of
certification review and conditions, and related certification requirements and procedures.” Certifica-
tion Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210. While 401 certifications often cause extensive delay, one can debate
whether the delay is because of the complexity of the technical and biological issues, the substantive
and procedural requirements of modern environmental statutes, applicant foot-dragging, failure of
FERC to update the license or require appropriate reporting and monitoring before the relicensing
process is initiated, or lack of state resources or redirecting those resources to more immediate issues
like drought response. It is likely that delay occurs for all those reasons.
176 California v. Andrew Wheeler, No.: 3:20-cv-4869 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2020). Plaintiffs
represent the States of California, Washington, New York, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Caroline, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, the District of
Columbia, and the California State Water Resources Control Board. See also, Am. Rivers v.
Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-04636 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2020); Suquamish Tribe v. Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-
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Additionally, immediately upon taking office, President Biden is-
sued an Executive Order directing numerous executive agencies to re-
view federal regulations enacted during the Trump Administration that
may be inconsistent with the purpose of the order (primarily aimed at
protecting public health and the environment from the impacts of climate
change).177  For any such regulations identified, the federal agencies are
directed to consider suspending, revising, or rescinding them.178  The
Certification Rule is among several rules under U.S. EPA’s jurisdiction
subject to such review.179
Of the numerous changes contained in the Certification Rule, the
following focusses on three of the most noteworthy ones.
1. The Scope of Certification Authority
The Certification Rule drastically narrows the scope of certification
authority in a couple ways.  First and foremost, it limits the scope of
certifications to the consideration solely of the impacts of “dis-
charges.”180  That limitation departs from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
long-standing holding in PUD No. 1 that a state’s certification authority
extends to impacts of the construction or operation of the facility’s “ac-
tivity as a whole,” upon the triggering event of the existence of a “dis-
charge.”181  U.S. EPA justifies that significant departure by seizing on
the different language used in section 401(a)(1) and 401(d).
06137 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2020); Del. Riverkeeper Network v. EPA, No. 2:20-CV-3412 (E.D. Pa.
July 13, 2020); S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Andrew Wheeler, No. 2:20-cv-03062 (D.S.C.
Aug. 26, 2020).
177 Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“Protecting Public Health and
the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis”).
178 Id.
179 The Biden-Harris transition team put out a fact sheet identifying the list of agency actions
subject to review in accordance with the executive order. The U.S. EPA subsequently requested the
U.S. Department of Justice to seek stays or abeyances of federal actions challenging rules subject to
U.S. EPA’s review. Rebecca Beitsch, Biden EPA Asks DOJ to Hit Pause on Defense of Trump-era
Rules, THE HILL (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:03 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/535450-
biden-epa-asks-doj-to-hit-pause-on-defense-of-trump-era-rules. At the time of this writing, the court
ordered the multi-state challenge brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California to be held in abeyance for 60 days, until April 20, 2021. Order re Joint Motion to Hold
Proceedings in Abeyance, California v. Andrew Wheeler, No.: 3:20-cv-4869 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22,
2021).
180 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,251-53 (codified at 40 CFR §§ 121.3 (defining
the scope of certification as “limited to assuring that a discharge [. . .] will comply with water quality
requirements”), 121.1(n) (defining “water quality requirements” as the provisions of sections “301,
302, 303, 306, and 307 of the Clean Water Act” and state “requirements for point source discharges
into waters of the United States”)).
181 PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. 700, 711-12 (1994).
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U.S. EPA pivots from PUD No. 1’s holding by dismissing the no-
tion that it was based on a plain reading of the text.182  U.S. EPA argues
that because section 401(a) uses “discharge” and section 401(d), “appli-
cant,” ambiguity is created which opens the door for its statutory inter-
pretation.183  In so doing, U.S. EPA concludes that the Court’s holding
does not prevent it from reaching a different interpretation.184  U.S. EPA
also states that PUD No. 1’s holding relied, at least in part, on U.S.
EPA’s interpretation of its certification regulations that pre-dated the
1972 Clean Water Act amendments.185  Because U.S. EPA now believes
the “most appropriate” interpretation is that “applicant” in section 401(d)
simply refers to the entity responsible for complying with certification,
the term should not be construed as broadening the scope of certification
authority.186
As for the meaning of “discharge” to trigger section 401(a) author-
ity, U.S. EPA affirms the decision in S.D. Warren, that “any discharge”
should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and should not be inter-
preted to require a “discharge of pollutants.”187  Yet with respect to the
other critically important aspect of certification authority—the additional
language in section 401(d) that specifies certifications may include re-
quirements as necessary to assure compliance with “with any other ap-
propriate requirement of State law,”—the Certification Rule even further
limits the scope of water quality problems the states may address.  U.S.
EPA had previously interpreted that language to include non-point dis-
charges to non-federal waters.188  Pursuant to decisional authority and
182 U.S. EPA also seems to admonish the Supreme Court’s “reasonable read” of the statutory
provisions and its failure to perform any legislative analysis of the amendments made to the Clean
Water Act.  85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,233.
183 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,232-34.
184 Id. at 42,233.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 42,232, 42,234.
187 Id. at 42,238 (discussing S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. 370, 376 (2006). See discussion of S.D.
Warren, supra Section VI.B.
188 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,234-35.  “Non-federal waters” refer to those
waters within a state’s boundaries that are not waters of the United States. Id. at 42,234. Non-federal
waters include groundwater and isolated wetlands. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
Under the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, promulgated by U.S. EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers under the Trump Administration, the definition of “waters of the United States,” was
revised and non-federal waters were expanded to include ephemeral waters and wetlands that were
no longer deemed adjacent to other jurisdictional waters. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule:
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (codified at
33 CFR §§ 328.3(c)(1) (definition of adjacent wetlands), 328.3(b)(3) (ephemeral streams)). The
Biden Administration has since directed U.S. EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to revisit
that rule considering the environmental priorities announced in the Administration’s Executive Or-
der. Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2020); Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions
for Review, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/state-
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U.S. EPA interpretation, states have used section 401(d) authority to ad-
dress a broad range of water quality problems (e.g., as noted in the dis-
cussion of PUD No. 1).  The Certification Rule now specifies that
certification authority is limited to assuring the discharge complies with
“water quality requirements,” and defines that term as limited to certain
provisions in the Clean Water Act and state “regulatory requirements for
point source discharges into waters of the United States.”189
Of course, section 401(d) does not contain any language to limit its
reach to impacts caused by point sources to federal jurisdictional waters.
U.S. EPA suggests that for reasons similar to why it has chosen to inter-
pret “applicant” in section 401(d) as not broadening “discharge” in sec-
tion 401(a), it also believes the section 401(d)’s express allowance that a
certification may include requirements necessary to assure compliance
“with any other appropriate requirement of State law” should not be read
any broader than its reach to point source discharges to waters of the
United States in section 401(a).190
While the meaning of the statutory text in section 401(d) is not en-
tirely clear, its interpretation by the agency charged with its implementa-
tion must be reasonable, and U.S. EPA’s interpretation of the scope of
certification authority is challenging to reconcile.191  Its effort to align
sections 401(a) and 401(d) renders meaningless the additional language
in section 401(d).  As a result, as interpreted by U.S. EPA, there is no
difference between the triggering discharge under section 401(a) and the
state’s ability to include water quality protection requirements in the cer-
tification to address impacts from the facility as a whole or from
nonpoint sources to nonfederal waters under section 401(d).
In limiting the reach of certification authority to begin and end with
a point source discharge to waters of the United States, the Certification
Rule drastically reduces the ability of states to address the full scope of
impacts to water quality and beneficial uses occasioned by hydropower
projects.  As earlier noted, those impacts could include water quality
problems from nonpoint pollution that occurs within a reservoir and not
from ongoing point source discharges, including: dissolved minerals, soil
ments-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-agency-actions-for-review/. As a result, the scope of
waters that comprise non-federal waters is subject to change.
189 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,251-53 (codified at 40 CFR §§ 121.3 (defining
the scope of certification as “limited to assuring that a discharge [. . .] will comply with water quality
requirements”), 121.1(n) (defining “water quality requirements” as the provisions of sections “301,
302, 303, 306, and 307 of the Clean Water Act” and state “requirements for point source discharges
into waters of the United States”)).
190 Id. at 42,253.
191 Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing and quoting
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43).
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erosion, or oxygen content; barriers to fish passage from existing dams
and diversion works; and reduced instream flows where water is diverted
from a stream but there is no discharge back into the stream after use;
and impacts to non-federal waters, such as groundwater and certain iso-
lated wetlands or ephemeral streams.192
As a result, with its Certification Rule, U.S. EPA dispenses with
what the S.D. Warren Court observed was squarely preserved by the
Clean Water Act’s system respecting a state’s concern: “state authority to
address a broad range of pollution.”193
2. State Conditions and Denials
Although section 401 gives states broad authority to deny and con-
dition certifications, the Certification Rule authorizes the federal agency
to encroach on that authority.  It establishes new procedural requirements
that must accompany state-imposed conditions or a denial of certification
and, as discussed in the next section, authorizes the federal agency to
find waiver if the federal agency determines the state action failed to
meet those requirements.
With respect to the new procedural requirements, the Certification
Rule requires any condition to be accompanied by written information
explaining “why the condition is necessary to assure that the discharge
from the proposed project will comply with water quality requirements”
and a citation to the federal or state law that authorizes the condition.194
Similarly, for any denial of certification, the Certification Rule requires
the state to provide written information that identifies “the specific water
quality requirement with which the discharge will not comply,” and that
explains why the discharge is unable to comply with the identified re-
quirements.195  If the denial is due to insufficient information, the state
must identify the information that it needs.196
U.S. EPA’s rationale for those procedural requirements is to in-
crease transparency and, in the furtherance of promoting regulatory cer-
192 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174-77 (D.C. Circuit, 1982). With its
Certification Rule, U.S. EPA also finds that “reopener” clauses, included to ensure water quality is
protected over the relatively long life of the license, are inconsistent with section 401 and not per-
missible under the Certification Rule’s requirement that the state not take any action that extends the
reasonable period of time identified by the federal agency to act on the certification. Certification
Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,280 (see 40 CFR § 121.6(e)). See also Sawyer, supra note 69.
193 S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006).
194 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 42,286 (codified at 40 CFR § 121.7(d)(1)(i)-(ii)).
195 Id. at 42,286 (codified at 40 CFR § 121.7(e)(ii)-(iii)).
196 Id. at 42,286 (codified at 40 CFR § 121.7(e)(iii)).
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tainty, to make sure the certification authority understands its own
authority as currently interpreted by U.S. EPA.197
Prior interpretations from U.S. EPA did not require any specific
findings for a condition or denial.  More significantly, and as discussed
above, prior U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in-
terpretations did not permit a federal agency to interfere with a state’s
mandatory conditioning and denial authority, and most certainly did not
allow the federal agency to unilaterally find waiver based on its own
discretionary decision that the state failed to meet new regulatory
requirements.
3. Implied Waiver
One of the most striking features of the Certification Rule is that it
specifies the federal agencies’ role in determining whether a state’s certi-
fication complies with section 401 and empowers federal agencies to
void the denial or condition if it finds that it does not.  To arrive there,
U.S. EPA chronicles numerous cases that have evaluated the federal
agencies’ role in the certification process.198  On the one hand, federal
agencies have been counseled not to interfere with a state’s certification,
even in deciding the condition does not go “far enough” in protecting
water quality standards.199  In other cases, the federal agencies are in-
structed that they may include conditions in the federal license more pro-
tective than that required by the state and, in still other cases, that federal
agencies have an affirmative obligation to determine whether the certify-
ing authority correctly complied with the procedural components of the
statute.200  With its Certification Rule, U.S. EPA purports to reconcile
the patchwork of case law and articulate the federal agencies’ role in the
certification process.201
Specifically, U.S. EPA interprets that portion of section 401(a) that
specifies that a state waives certification when it “fails or refuses to act
on a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which
197 Id. at 42,256, 42,258.
198 Id. at 42,222-24.
199 Id. at 42,223 (citing and quoting, among other cases, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding the federal agency has no authority to replace a
state’s condition even where the federal agency deems it to be more protective of beneficial uses)).
200 Id. at 42,223 (citing and quoting, among other cases, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed.
Energy Regul. Comm’n., 45 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding FERC’s license condition
increasing minimum instream flows necessary to create mist designed to “augment the Tribe’s relig-
ious experience”) and Keating v. FERC, 927, F.2d 616, 622-23, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“FERC must
at least decide whether the state’s assertion of revocation satisfies section 401(a)(3)’s predicate
requirements)).
201 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,223-24.
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shall not exceed one year).”202  As improbable as it may seem, U.S. EPA
purports to “clarify” the meaning of the statute by explaining that a key
ambiguity in the phrase “fail or refuse to act” is the meaning of “to
act.”203  U.S. EPA concludes that “to act,” and with it, the federal
agency’s corresponding authority to find waiver, must be informed by
the procedural context of applicable statutes and regulations rather than
to mean “just any act.”204  The Certification Rule goes on to specify what
“acts” are not in conformance with section 401 and therefore constitute
waiver.205
Under the Certification Rule, waiver occurs when the state does not
(1) act within the reasonable period of time; (2) provide certifications in
writing; (3) provide the findings the Certification Rule requires to sup-
port a denial of certification (discussed above); (4) comply with other
procedural requirements of section 401 (e.g., providing public notice); or
(5) provide the findings the Certification Rule requires to support a con-
dition (discussed above).206  Moreover, where the federal agency deems
the state’s supporting information infirm or absent and finds waiver, the
federal agency will grant the federal permit or license in the case of a
denial of certification, or without the condition if a condition is at
issue.207
Assigning the federal agency with authority to review whether the
state’s written explanation accompanying the condition or denial satisfies
the new procedural requirements or is in some manner inadequate—and
to find waiver in the latter circumstance—is incongruent with the plain
language under the Clean Water Act, and precedents from the Second
Circuit in American Rivers v. FERC and other federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals concerning the federal agency’s lack of authority to review or
modify a state’s conditions of certification, and in a manner that under-
mines state self-governance.208
Although cast as procedural requirements, potentially as a means to
get around precedents concerning the federal agency’s lack of authority
202 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
203 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,266.
204 Id. at 42,266.
205 Id. at 42,286 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 121.9(a), (b)).
206 Id. at 42,286 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.9(a)(2)(i)-(iv), 121.9(b)).
207 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,286 (codified at 40 CFR § 121.9(b)). Regarding waiver for conditions
not supported by sufficient findings, U.S. EPA provides that that such waiver is severable—waiver
is limited to the condition and not the overall certification.  85 Fed. Reg. 42,267.
208 See, e.g., Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1997); see, e.g.,
Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. U.S. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982).
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to second guess state-imposed conditions,209 FERC’s determination that
a state’s finding is inadequate has the drastic effect of voiding the state’s
certification or condition altogether.210  Of course, there is nothing in
section 401, express or implied, that gives the federal agency authority to
evaluate whether a state has adequately justified its decision to deny or
condition certification.211  Thus, rather than falling within the proper
bounds of FERC’s authority to determine certain procedural aspects of
section 401 are satisfied (e.g., timeliness, the proper certifying authority,
or a state’s assertion of revocation) acknowledged by American Rivers
and in Keating v. FERC, these procedural requirements likely run afoul
of those proper bounds.212  This aspect of the Certification Rule will un-
doubtedly be addressed by courts on challenges to the plain reading of
section 401 and as federal agencies apply it to the states’ actions on certi-
fications moving forward.
Finally, yet importantly, while the Certification Rule codifies
Hoopa Valley’s central holding,213 it also extends it to preventing a state
from requesting the project applicant withdraw its certification request
and resubmit it with additional information the state deems necessary for
its review.214  The clear implication here is that certifying states will sim-
ply have to deny certifications without prejudice when the applicant fails
209 See supra text accompanying note 169; see also, Keating v. FERC, 927, F.2d 616, 622-23,
625 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“FERC must at least decide whether the state’s assertion of revocation satis-
fies section 401(a)(3)’s predicate requirements”).
210 Of course, state law may impose requirements for findings to support agency decisions.
See, e.g. Asociacion de Gente Unida por el Agua v. Cent. Valley Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd.,
210 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1281 (2012). But review of those findings is in state court, and if the court
finds the agency has failed to make adequate findings the remedy is a remand to the state agency to
reconsider its decision. See, e.g., Id. The agency’s failure to make adequate findings is not a bar to a
decision on remand reaching the same result, or substituting different conditions addressed to the
same issue, if that decision is supported by adequate findings. Additionally, although the certifica-
tion at issue is subject to the Natural Gas Act rather than the Federal Power Act, with judicial review
in the federal Courts of Appeals instead of state court, and pre-dates the Certification Rule, in Moun-
tain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, the court found
that denial of certification was within the state’s authority, but the state failed to adequately explain
its reasoning. 990 F.3d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 2021). The remedy was a remand to the state to explain its
reasoning. Id. at 833. That is in sharp contrast to the Certification Rule, where the remedy for a
state’s failure to explain its denial is to void the denial and treat it as a waiver. Certification Rule, 85
Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,286 (codified at 40 CFR §§ 121.9(a)(2)).
211 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (providing “[n]o license or permit shall be granted if
certification has been denied by the State”) and 1341(d) (providing that requirements set forth in the
certification by the State “shall become a condition” of the federal license) with 40 CFR
§ 121.9(a)(2)(iii), (iv) (authorizing the federal agency to find waiver where the state has granted a
certification with conditions or denied certification upon the state’s failure to satisfy the new proce-
dural requirements that must accompany a certification condition or denial).
212 Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 110-111 (2d Cir. 1997).
213 See discussion of Hoopa Valley, supra Section IV.B.
214 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,285-86 (codified at 40 CFR § 121.6(e)).
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to provide information the state needs to complete its review.  Of course,
under the Certification Rule, FERC would have the ability to review the
state’s findings underlying that denial and potentially void the denial and
find waiver if it deems the findings inadequate.215
It is worth emphasizing that prior interpretations of section 401 have
never encompassed these procedural requirements.  Never under any cir-
cumstance has a federal agency ever been permitted to find waiver based
on its own determination that a state’s condition or denial is insufficient.
This aspect of the new rule effectively grants the federal agency veto
authority over the states’ certification conditions and denials—authority
that is at odds with the plain language of the law, decisional authority,
and the principles of cooperative federalism.
VII. CONCLUSION
For now, California will have to contend with the Hoopa Valley
case and its fallout.  It is possible that the FERC waiver decisions the
State Water Board is challenging (along with others being challenged
nationwide) will limit the reach of Hoopa Valley and reduce its con-
straints on states’ section 401 certification authority.  But even if those
challenges are not successful, since the California Legislature amended
the California Water Code to allow certifications to be issued before
completion of the CEQA process where there is significant risk of
waiver, the basic ability to exercise the authority in California is pre-
served for now.
With the Certification Rule’s narrowing of the scope of section 401
certification, however, U.S. EPA under the Trump Administration drasti-
cally undercut the state’s ability to assure impacts from FERC-licensed
hydropower facilities comply with the full range of water quality pollu-
tion control requirements under state law.  Taken together, the new sub-
stantive and procedural requirements of the Certification Rule represent a
radical departure from long-standing Supreme Court and Court of Ap-
peals precedents, as well as prior U.S. EPA interpretations, and state ac-
tion on certifications.  In so doing, the Certification Rule upends the
fundamental structure of the Clean Water Act that affords states with
substantial authority to regulate water quality within their respective bor-
ders.  Moreover, the Rule disrupts the cooperative federalism scheme on
which the Clean Water Act is premised.
To be sure, the Certification Rule’s path is fraught with its potential
demise.  Ongoing litigation could succeed in having the rule set aside
215 Id. at 42,286 (codified at 40 CFR §§ 121.9(a)(2)(iii), 121.9(c)).
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and rescinded.  U.S. EPA under the Biden Administration would then
have an opportunity to review the Rule and initiate the full public process
to develop a new rule.  Even if the Certification Rule is not set aside by
the courts, U.S. EPA could undertake to rescind the rule through a formal
rulemaking process.
In the meantime, FERC continues to apply its expansive interpreta-
tion of Hoopa Valley and is likely to further limit state authority through
its application of the Certification Rule.  For now, one thing is certain:
Except where waiver decisions are successfully challenged or repealed,
states will be substantially deprived of their authority under the Clean
Water Act to protect the quality of the waters within their states.
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